Legal Reasoning MCQ Quiz in తెలుగు - Objective Question with Answer for Legal Reasoning - ముఫ్త్ [PDF] డౌన్‌లోడ్ కరెన్

There is no legal definition of the term marital rape. In a common man’s language marital rape or spousal rape is simply defined as the act of sexual intercourse with one’s spouse without their consent. It is also considered a form of domestic violence as well as sexual abuse. In the earlier times sexual intercourse within marriage was considered to be a part of the marriage and the husband had the right to do so without the consent of his wife. However, in the present times, it has been classified as rape by many societies around the world including a lot of countries that have criminalized marital rape. Countries like New Zealand, Greece, Argentina, Ecuador and many more have criminalized marital rape where it is illegal to have sexual intercourse with your spouse without her consent. In the above-mentioned countries necessary laws have been implemented that consider marital rape as a crime and provide punishment for the same. However, marriages in India are a way to get the consent of a woman to perform sexual intercourse. Once a woman is married she becomes the property of the husband and irrespective of the fact whether she is willing to engage in sexual intercourse or not, if she is a wife she will always be available. 
1. Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code – This section provides the definition of rape and lays down the provisions related to the same. It states that a man is said to have committed rape if he has sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent or by obtaining her consent by putting her under pressure or obtaining the consent of a woman by toxication or by reason of unsoundness of mind. It also states that the consent of a woman below the age of 16 years does not matter as having sexual intercourse with a woman below the said age with or without her consent shall be considered rape. This section also contains an exception clause which state that sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, who is not below the age of 15 years, is not rape. 
2. Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code – This section contains provisions relating to punishment for rape. It states that whoever commits rape shall be imprisoned for a term which shall not be less than seven years or which may be for life or for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine unless the woman raped is his own wife and is not under the age of 12 years he shall be punished with imprisonment for either a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both.
3. Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code – This section contains provisions relating to unnatural offences. It states that whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman, or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. The exception clause in the above-mentioned Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code implies that it is legal for men to rape women who happen to be their wives who are aged 15 years or above. This exception clause exempts sexual intercourse with a wife without wilful consent, from the definition of rape, thus making it legal for men to rape women. It is noteworthy to mention that most countries recognize rape as rape, including marital rape which is criminalized in most countries, however, India continues to be one of those countries where Marital rape is not considered to be rape and is decriminalized. The Indian government has time and again argued that criminalizing marital rape in India is against the Indian culture as the majority of people in India are illiterate, uneducated, poor, conservative, and religious. They believe that the mindset of society is to treat marriage as a sacrament and that a husband cannot rape his wife because a good Indian wife gives her consent for almost everything when she is married. Secondly, the fact that makes it legal for Indian men to continue to rape their wives is that once a woman is married her perpetual consent is implied, she hands over continuous sexual consent and control over her body to her husband and continues to engage in sexual intercourse even if it is against her will. The perception of society that a good Indian wife must obey and do whatever her husband expects out of her, including engaging in sexual intercourse, makes it legal for men to rape their wives. Therefore, the existing laws and the general perception of the society on marriage implies that it is legal to commit rape in India as long as a man is married to that woman.
In our country, Marital rape continues to be decriminalized which leads to violation of the fundamental rights of a person/woman under the Indian Constitution.
1. Article 14, Equality before the law – Under this Article, the Indian Constitution guarantees equality before the law or equal protection of laws to any person. However, the rape law exception that states sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife who is below the age of 15 years, does not amount to rape, discriminates against females who have been and continue to be raped by their own husbands by denying them equal protection from rape and sexual harassment. 
2. Article 21, Protection of Life and Personal Liberty – The exception laid down under section 375 of IPC prioritizes and protects only unmarried women from rape which directly contradicts guaranteed equal protection of laws. Exception 2 is also a violation of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution which states “No person shall be denied of his life and personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law”. In recent years, the Supreme Court has interpreted Article 21 to extend beyond the literal guarantee to life and personal liberty and to include the rights to health, privacy, dignity, safe living conditions, a safe environment, and continuous internet among others. 
In Independent Thought vs Union Of India on 11 October 2017, the Supreme Court extended the age limit specified in Section 375 of IPC from 15 years to 18 years stating that Exception 2 to Section 375 of IPC so far as it relates to a girl child below 18 years is liable to be struck down as it is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and violative of the rights of the girl child and not fair, just and reasonable and therefore, violative of Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
In Suchita Srivastava & Anr vs Chandigarh Administration on 28 August 2009, said the right to make choices about sexual activity is very much within the scope of rights to personal liberty, privacy, dignity, and bodily integrity under Article 21 of the Constitution.
In Justice K.S.Puttaswamy(Retd) vs Union Of India on 26 September 2018, the Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right and specifically stated that it includes “decisional privacy reflected by an ability to make intimate decisions primarily consisting of one’s sexual or procreative nature and decisions in respect of intimate relations.” Forced sexual intercourse and cohabitation is a violation of that fundamental right. Since this ruling doesn’t differentiate between married and unmarried women and there is no explicit ruling (thankfully) that says women lose their fundamental right to privacy upon marriage — all women have the fundamental right to be able to consent and to be able to say no.
As mentioned earlier, the exception clause of Section 375 of IPC only protects a woman (now) below the age of 18 years from having unwilling sexual intercourse with her husband and fails to protect married women above the specified age. It is extremely important to criminalize marital rape in India because the existing laws only protect unmarried women against rape and exclude married women from the same. Every woman whether married or unmarried has the right to have control over her own body and just because a woman is married should not imply that she will be ready to have sexual intercourse with her husband whenever he wants to or against her will. As previously mentioned, marital rape has been criminalized in a lot of countries but India continues to be one of those 26 countries that do not consider marital rape to be a criminal offense. In our country, people sympathize with a victim of rape because it is such a heinous crime, however, when it comes to marital rape the general perception of society is that she is a wife and it is her duty to listen to her husband and maintain a sexual relationship with him for the smooth running of the marriage. People fail to recognize how hard it might be for all those women who are suffering in silence only because they are forced to engage in sexual intercourse against their will only because they are married to someone. It is extremely important to criminalize marital rape because just because a woman is someone’s wife it does not mean that she will be available 24 x 7. 
In Nimeshbhai Bharatbhai Desai vs State Of Gujarat on 2 April 2018, the Gujarat High Court held that the exemption given to marital rape stems from a long outdated notion of marriage which regarded wives as nothing more than the property of their husbands and that marital rape ought to be a crime and not a concept. It was further held that there would most definitely be objections such as a perceived threat to the integrity of the marital union and the possibility of the misuse of the penal provisions. It is not really true that the private or domestic domain has always been outside the purview of law. The law against domestic violence already covers both physical and sexual abuse as grounds for the legal system to intervene. It is difficult to argue that a complaint of marital rape will ruin a marriage, while a complaint of domestic violence against a spouse will not. It has long been time to jettison the notion of ‘implied consent’ in marriage. The law must uphold the bodily autonomy of all women, irrespective of their marital status. The Gujarat High Court further stated that a law that does not give married and unmarried women equal protection creates conditions that lead to marital rape. It allows the men and women to believe that wife rape is acceptable. Making wife rape illegal or an offense will remove the destructive attitudes that promote marital rape. Such an action raises a moral boundary that informs society that a punishment results if the boundary is transgressed. The Husbands may then begin to recognize that marital rape is wrong. Recognition coupled with the criminal punishment should deter the husbands from raping their wives. Women should not have to tolerate rape and violence in the marriage. The total statutory abolition of the marital rape exemption is the first necessary step in teaching societies that dehumanized treatment of women will not be tolerated and that marital rape is not a husband’s privilege, but rather a violent act and an injustice that must be criminalized.

The Supreme Court on July 19 agreed to hear a plea seeking to redefine the contours of the constitutional immunity enjoyed by the Governor of a state.
Article 361 of the Constitution shields the President and Governor from criminal prosecution, and bars any judicial scrutiny of their actions. Given that the case could have significant ramifications on the role of the constitutional head of a state, the court also asked Attorney General for India R Venkataramani to weigh in.
A three-judge Bench - comprising Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud, and Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra - took up the issue after a petition was moved by a contractual woman employee of West Bengal Raj Bhavan. She has alleged sexual harassment by Governor CV Ananda Bose.
Article 361 states that the President, or the Governor of a state, "shall not be answerable to any court for the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of those powers and duties", unless it is by Parliament for impeachment from office.
The provision further says "no criminal proceedings whatsoever shall be instituted or continued"; "no process for the arrest or imprisonment" can take place while the President, or the Governor, holds office.
The interpretation of these phrases in Article 361(2) and 361(3) - "criminal proceedings" and "process for the arrest or imprisonment" is what is now before the SC. The court will consider whether that process covers a registration of FIR, initiation of a preliminary inquiry, or a magistrate taking cognisance of an offence,which is the technical start of a criminal case.
In the West Bengal case, the petitioner has argued that if none of the aforementioned actions can be taken against Governor Bose till he demits office, it could lead to a violation of rights, and impact the evidence in this case.
In its order, the SC said "the interpretation of clause (2) [of Article 361] arises for determination, more particularly, when criminal proceedings would be construed to have been 'instituted'."
Origins of Governor's immunity
The protection given to the President and the Governor can be traced to the Latin maxim rex non potest peccare or "the king can do no wrong", which is rooted in English legal traditions.
The Constituent Assembly discussed the introduction of Article 361 - or Draft Article 302 as it was known then on September 8, 1949. On criminal immunity, Assembly Member H V Kamath from the Indian National Congress raised certain prescient questions. In case the President, or the Governor, commits a crime, he asked "Does this clause mean that no proceedings can be instituted against him (the President or the Governor) during the whole prescribed term, or whether it means while he is in office only". He also asked if the President should remove "a Governor or a Ruler committing a criminal act" in case a prima facie case is made against the Governor concerned.
However, the article was adopted without any further debate on criminal immunity. In the last decade, the courts have shed light on what it means for criminal proceedings to be "instituted" against the Governor, and when the protection under Article 361(2) lapses.

Judicial interpretation
The SC did so in the 2017 criminal case - State vs Kalyan Singh & Ors - concerning the Babri Masjid demolition in 1992. The court delayed the trial against then Rajasthan Governor Kalyan Singh, who was one of the accused in the case.
In its order, the SC said being the Governor, Kalyan Singh "is entitled to immunity under Article 361 of the Constitution as long as he remains Governor of Rajasthan. The Court of Sessions will frame charges and move against him as soon as he ceases to be Governor".
In 2015, the Madhya Pradesh High Court categorically held that Article 361(2) "guarantees absolute protection from any malicious campaign or publicity against the Head of a State, so as not to undermine the solemnity of that office."
The observation came in a case pertaining to the Vyapam scam. Then Governor of Madhya Pradesh Ram Naresh Yadav was one of the accused in the scam, and the HC had to determine if the registration of an FIR against him would amount to criminal proceedings being "instituted" in the case.
In its ruling, the HC allowed investigation in that FIR against other accused, while "effacing" the name of the Governor till he occupied the office. As Yadav died in November 2016, the SC did not rule in appeal.
Another judicial intervention on the Governor's immunity came in the landmark 2006 ruling in Rameshwar Prasad vs Union of India. In the case, the SC had to deal with the Governor's immunity in civil cases after recommending the Bihar Assembly's dissolution in 2005.
The court said while the Governor enjoys "complete immunity" when exercising their powers under Article 361(1), this immunity "does not, however, take away the power of the Court to examine the validity of the action including on the ground of malafides (actions taken in bad faith)".
The SC in that case examined the Governor's actions in discharging his constitutional powers, which can be placed on a higher threshold compared to acts outside the discharge of constitutional or any official duties

The Supreme Court on July 19 agreed to hear a plea seeking to redefine the contours of the constitutional immunity enjoyed by the Governor of a state.
Article 361 of the Constitution shields the President and Governor from criminal prosecution, and bars any judicial scrutiny of their actions. Given that the case could have significant ramifications on the role of the constitutional head of a state, the court also asked Attorney General for India R Venkataramani to weigh in.
A three-judge Bench - comprising Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud, and Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra - took up the issue after a petition was moved by a contractual woman employee of West Bengal Raj Bhavan. She has alleged sexual harassment by Governor CV Ananda Bose.
Article 361 states that the President, or the Governor of a state, "shall not be answerable to any court for the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of those powers and duties", unless it is by Parliament for impeachment from office.
The provision further says "no criminal proceedings whatsoever shall be instituted or continued"; "no process for the arrest or imprisonment" can take place while the President, or the Governor, holds office.
The interpretation of these phrases in Article 361(2) and 361(3) - "criminal proceedings" and "process for the arrest or imprisonment" is what is now before the SC. The court will consider whether that process covers a registration of FIR, initiation of a preliminary inquiry, or a magistrate taking cognisance of an offence,which is the technical start of a criminal case.
In the West Bengal case, the petitioner has argued that if none of the aforementioned actions can be taken against Governor Bose till he demits office, it could lead to a violation of rights, and impact the evidence in this case.
In its order, the SC said "the interpretation of clause (2) [of Article 361] arises for determination, more particularly, when criminal proceedings would be construed to have been 'instituted'."
Origins of Governor's immunity
The protection given to the President and the Governor can be traced to the Latin maxim rex non potest peccare or "the king can do no wrong", which is rooted in English legal traditions.
The Constituent Assembly discussed the introduction of Article 361 - or Draft Article 302 as it was known then on September 8, 1949. On criminal immunity, Assembly Member H V Kamath from the Indian National Congress raised certain prescient questions. In case the President, or the Governor, commits a crime, he asked "Does this clause mean that no proceedings can be instituted against him (the President or the Governor) during the whole prescribed term, or whether it means while he is in office only". He also asked if the President should remove "a Governor or a Ruler committing a criminal act" in case a prima facie case is made against the Governor concerned.
However, the article was adopted without any further debate on criminal immunity. In the last decade, the courts have shed light on what it means for criminal proceedings to be "instituted" against the Governor, and when the protection under Article 361(2) lapses.

Judicial interpretation
The SC did so in the 2017 criminal case - State vs Kalyan Singh & Ors - concerning the Babri Masjid demolition in 1992. The court delayed the trial against then Rajasthan Governor Kalyan Singh, who was one of the accused in the case.
In its order, the SC said being the Governor, Kalyan Singh "is entitled to immunity under Article 361 of the Constitution as long as he remains Governor of Rajasthan. The Court of Sessions will frame charges and move against him as soon as he ceases to be Governor".
In 2015, the Madhya Pradesh High Court categorically held that Article 361(2) "guarantees absolute protection from any malicious campaign or publicity against the Head of a State, so as not to undermine the solemnity of that office."
The observation came in a case pertaining to the Vyapam scam. Then Governor of Madhya Pradesh Ram Naresh Yadav was one of the accused in the scam, and the HC had to determine if the registration of an FIR against him would amount to criminal proceedings being "instituted" in the case.
In its ruling, the HC allowed investigation in that FIR against other accused, while "effacing" the name of the Governor till he occupied the office. As Yadav died in November 2016, the SC did not rule in appeal.
Another judicial intervention on the Governor's immunity came in the landmark 2006 ruling in Rameshwar Prasad vs Union of India. In the case, the SC had to deal with the Governor's immunity in civil cases after recommending the Bihar Assembly's dissolution in 2005.
The court said while the Governor enjoys "complete immunity" when exercising their powers under Article 361(1), this immunity "does not, however, take away the power of the Court to examine the validity of the action including on the ground of malafides (actions taken in bad faith)".
The SC in that case examined the Governor's actions in discharging his constitutional powers, which can be placed on a higher threshold compared to acts outside the discharge of constitutional or any official duties

India has enacted laws to address sexual harassment at the workplace, with the landmark legislation being the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition, and Redressal) Act, 2013. This law mandates the establishment of internal complaints committees (ICCs) in organizations with ten or more employees. These committees are responsible for receiving and redressing complaints of sexual harassment.
Despite the legal framework, there are challenges in its implementation. Many organizations still lack ICCs, and awareness of the law's provisions among employees is often limited. Moreover, the focus has traditionally been on women as victims, potentially neglecting cases involving men or individuals belonging to the LGBTQ+ community.
Addressing sexual harassment at the workplace in India requires acknowledging and challenging deep-seated cultural factors that contribute to the problem. Hierarchical structures, power imbalances, and the stigma surrounding reporting harassment can prevent victims from speaking out. Additionally, societal norms and stereotypes often perpetuate a culture of victim-blaming, discouraging survivors from seeking justice.
To combat sexual harassment effectively, a cultural shift within organizations and society at large is imperative. Employers should prioritize creating a safe and supportive environment, where reporting harassment is encouraged, and victims are assured of confidentiality and protection from retaliation.

In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court nullified its order of 2017 that insisted on a Pollution Under Control (PUC) certificate before can one can buy a third-party vehicle insurance. It is arrived at the backdrop of a case by the General Insurance Council for assessing problems with the earlier policy that caused several ill-effects. 
The court further observed that ever since the implementation of the said order in 2017 the insurance of vehicles by its owners and compensation for accidents has significantly reduced. Acknowledging the fact of the case, the Supreme Court decided to do away with the PUC requirement, while at the same time underlining the need to check pollution. 

Based on this, the court recommended the use of remote sensing technology in tracking automobile emissions in the Delhi-NCR area to address any environmental impacts. This decision changes the policy of vehicle safety and insurance while a search for other approaches to solve the problem of air pollution is made. 

Although this change would generate the favorable outcome of improving insurance penetration, carrying out the mandate stripped from PUC, representatives must oversee the consequences this change has on air quality and thus encourage the formulation of effective measures to regulate emissions. However, the PUC certificates are still legal requirements for the vehicles. 

The impact of this judgment of the Supreme Court which quashes the provision which makes the PUC certificate mandatory for insurance renewal cannot be overemphasized. 

On the one hand, this decision should lead to an increase in insurance penetration rates as vehicle owners do not have to worry about obtaining a PUC certificate to receive renewed policies anymore. This may mean that more vehicles are insured which may in turn enhance road safety since more drivers would be financially liable in the event of an accident. 

However, there is criticism over the effects that the measures are likely to have on the quality of air within the environment. If the renewal of insurance is no longer directly linked to PUC certification, vehicle owners may end up less motivated to go in for regular emission checks. This could further worsen pollution levels; especially in the cities that experience poor fresh air quality in the current society. 

To counter this risk, the Supreme Court has recommended looking into other options for supervising automobile emissions like remote sensing. The effectiveness of such interventions shall be paramount, in the event of realizing goals geared towards improved insurance coverage, without being overshadowed by poor standards of air quality.

“Innocent until proven guilty,” the legal system of India depends on this statement ensuring that no wrong is done to an innocent person. Despite an individual being accused of a criminal offence, the person should be treated as a human being. The Indian Constitution illustrates certain rights to the arrested person to protect them from unlawful detention. Mostly, the laws related to arrest are defined under the various Sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 but the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 also includes certain scenarios or cases related to the arrest. The procedures followed for Arrest under CrPC, 1973 and Arrest under CPC, 1908 are different but one similar aspect is to protect an innocent from being unlawfully detained. Hence, it provides certain rights for an arrested person. In this article, we will delve into the important rights of arrested persons in India along with related case laws. 
Rights of Arrested Person in India
The right to remain silent during the investigation process or trials or proceedings helps the arrested person avoid self-incrimination. The primary principle of this right is to ensure that no individual is forced to provide evidence that can be used against them in legal proceedings. It has been mentioned under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” 
Right to Know the Grounds of Arrest
In Indian law, the right to be informed about the grounds of an individual’s arrest is a basic right given to the arrested person. This right is available to every Indian citizen who is being arrested and it is the duty of the authorized personnel, a police officer, to tell the arrested person about the grounds of their arrest. Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India states that “No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.” If an arrested person has timely and appropriate knowledge about the reason or the grounds of arrest then he/she can move to the proper court for bail.
According to Section 50(1) of CrPC states that “Every police officer or other person arresting any person without warrant shall forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest.” In short, it ensures that every individual is aware of the charge against them which further helps them understand the reason for the arrest. Moreover, a police officer or other person making the arrest should inform the arrest and place where the arrested person is being held to his friends or relatives or any person nominated by the arrested person for giving such information, as defined under Section 50(A) CrPC. Along with this, Section 55 of the CrPC illustrates the ‘procedure when a police officer deputes a subordinate to arrest without warrant’. 
In case, an arrest is made under a warrant then as per Section 75 of CrPC, a person who is executing a warrant of arrest should notify the substances to arrested person as well as should show him the warrant if required. The grounds for the arrest should be communicated to arrested persons in a language understood by them. 
Section 304 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, ensures legal aid to the accused at State expense in certain types of cases. It illustrates that “Where, in a trial before the Court of Session, the accused is not represented by a pleader, and where it appears to the Court that the accused has not sufficient means to engage a pleader, the Court shall assign a pleader for his defence at the expense of the State.” 
The accused person has another legal right under Indian law which is, the right to be taken before a Magistrate within 24 hours without delay. Despite the fact that whether the arrest was made with or without a warrant, the arrested person should be taken before a judicial officer without any delay. Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India states that “Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.” 
This right of the arrested person is mentioned under Section 56 of CrPC, “A police officer making an arrest without warrant shall, without unnecessary delay and subject to the provisions herein contained as to bail, take or send the person arrested before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case, or before the officer in charge of a police station.” Also, a person arrested should not be detained for more than 24 hours, Section 57. Moreover, Section 76 of CrPC, 1973, illustrates that any person executing a warrant of arrest (such as police officers) should bring the person arrested before the Court without unnecessary delay.
Every person to be arrested has the right to be released on bail on payment of the surety amount, in case of a bailable offence, and the same should be informed to him by the police officers. It is not an absolute right and mainly depends on factors such as the severity and nature of the offence, potential threat to society on release, and the likelihood of the arrested person fleeing away. 
To prevail over the principle of Natural Justice, the accused person is entitled to the right to a fair trial. The right to a fair trial is not mentioned under the provisions of CrPC but the right to equality has been mentioned in the Supreme law of land, Indian Constitution. Article 14 of the Indian Constitution states that every individual is equal in the eyes of the law. Along with this, in a Supreme Court judgment, it has been made mandatory to complete the investigation in the trial as soon as possible.
The arrested person has a right to consult a legal practitioner or a legal advisor which has been identified under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. As per Section 303 of the CrPC, “Any person accused of an offence before a Criminal Court, or against whom proceedings are instituted under this Code, may of right be defended by a pleader of his choice.” This right helps the accused person to safeguard his interests.
Right to be examined by the Medical Practitioner
Under Section 54 of the Indian Constitution, any arrested person has the right to be examined by a medical officer in the service of the Central or State Government. It further states that in case the medical officer is not available then the accused person is examined by a registered medical practitioner soon after the arrest is made. Provided that if the arrested person is a female, the examination of the body should be made only by or under the supervision of a female medical officer, and in case the female medical officer is not available then the examination should be done by a female registered medical practitioner.

In India, the concept of Data protection has evolved significantly over the past decade. Initially, the Information Technology Act of 2000, along with its amendment in 2008, laid the groundwork by addressing information security rather than comprehensive data protection. Moreover, The landmark judgment of the top Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Ors. v. Union of India in 2017, recognizing the right to privacy as a fundamental right, accelerated legislative efforts. This led to the drafting of the data protection bill, resulting in the introduction of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act of 2023.

The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDPA), marks a significant milestone as India's first comprehensive legislation on data protection. This Act regulates the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data. Until this Act is fully operational, the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act), and the Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011, continue to govern the Indian data protection framework. 

Section 43A of the IT Act deals with ‘Compensation for failure to protect data’. It states that “Where a body corporate, possessing, dealing or handling any sensitive personal data or information in a computer resource which it owns, controls or operates, is negligent in implementing and maintaining reasonable security practices and procedures and thereby causes wrongful loss or wrongful gain to any person, such body corporate shall be liable to pay damages by way of compensation to the person so affected.” 

Section 72A of the IT Act deals with ‘Punishment for disclosure of information in breach of lawful contract’. As per this Section, any person including an intermediary who, while providing services under the terms of a lawful contract, has secured access to any material containing personal information about another person, with the intent to cause or knowing that he is likely to cause wrongful loss or wrongful gain discloses such material to any other person, without the consent of the person concerned or in breach of a lawful contract should be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years, or with fine which may extend to 5 lakh rupees (5,00,000), or with both.
The enforcement of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, is entrusted to an independent body, the Data Protection Authority of India (DPA), that plays a crucial role in overseeing compliance and addressing the concerns of data principals. DPDPA empowers the DPA to conduct inquiries, issue directives, and enforce penalties, ensuring that data fiduciaries adhere to the principles of lawful processing and uphold the rights of individuals. 
The Act governs the processing of digital personal data within India and abroad, having an extra-territorial application with no restriction on international data transfers, provided the data pertains to offering goods or services within India. This includes data collected both online and offline that is subsequently digitized. DPDPA applies universally to all entities handling the personal data of Indian residents, irrespective of the entity's geographical location.
Section 2(j) of the DPDPA defines ‘Data Principal’ as “the individual to whom the personal data relates and where such individual is—
(i) a child, includes the parents or lawful guardian of such a child;
(ii) a person with disability, includes her lawful guardian, acting on her behalf.” 
They are granted several rights under the Act including accessing personal data, correcting inaccuracies, erasing data when it is no longer necessary, and nominating a representative to act on their behalf in cases of incapacity or death. Data principals also have the right to file grievances and are obligated to avoid submitting false complaints or impersonating others, with penalties applicable for violations. 
Section 2(i) of the DPDPA defines a data fiduciary as “any person who alone or in conjunction with other persons determines the purpose and means of processing of personal data.” Data fiduciaries implement robust security measures to prevent breaches and inform the Data Protection Board of India and affected individuals in case of data breaches. They must also delete personal data when its retention is no longer justified for legal purposes.

The Supreme Court recently observed that initiation of proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for cheque dishonour does not constitute continuing cause of action for initiating arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act).

A bench of Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud, Justice JB Pardiwala, and Justice Manoj Misra dismissed an arbitration petition seeking the appointment of an arbitrator eleven years after cheques were dishonoured, on the ground that the claims were barred by limitation.

Elfit Arabia, an entity incorporated in the United Arab Emirates, was approached by the respondents to finance a telecommunication project undertaken by Telesuprecon Nigeria Limited (TNL). A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was executed on June 1, 2004, with TNL represented by a director of Concept Hotel BARONS Limited, the first respondent. 
Pursuant to the terms of the MoU, the petitioners claim to have disbursed funds on various occasions. A supplementary MoU was executed on August 2, 2006,outlining the terms of repayment and settlement of the petitioners' dues, including a lien on the respondents' property and issuance of cheques as financial support.
On May 7, 2011, fifteen cheques amounting to Rs. 7.30 crores provided by the respondents were allegedly dishonoured. On June 2, 2011, the petitioners issued a legal notice to the respondents to implement the MoU and make the necessary payment. Eleven years later, on July 4, 2022, the petitioners invoked arbitration as per clause 19 of the MoU. The respondents did not reply to the notice. A fresh notice was issued on October 27, 2022, again calling for arbitration, which went unanswered.Subsequently, the present petition was filed before the Supreme Court under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act.

The respondents argued that the petitioner's claims were barred by limitation and should be dismissed by the Court. Petitioner contended that during the intervening period it initiated proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act against the respondents. The Magistrate acquitted the respondents on July 23, 2018. An appeal against this order is currently pending before the Bombay High Court. 

The Supreme Court noted that while the determination of whether a claim is barred by limitation typically falls within the arbitral tribunal's domain, the Court may intervene to reject clearly non-arbitrable or dead claims. The Court emphasized the need to prevent parties from being compelled into arbitration for claims that are demonstrably time-barred.

Referring to the principles established in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, the Court highlighted that it may interfere at the referral stage if the claim is ex-facie time-barred. 

The Supreme Court found that the notices invoking arbitration in July 2022 and October 2022 were issued eleven years after the cause of action arose in 2011, exceeding the three-year limitation period as per Article 55 of the Schedule under Limitation Act, 1963. The initiation of arbitration proceedings was hopelessly barred by limitation, the court said.

Additionally, the Court noted that proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, which were separately initiated, do not constitute a continuing cause of action for initiating arbitration. Therefore, the petitioners' argument that these proceedings implied a continuing cause of action was rejected.

Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the arbitration petition, stating that referring the dispute to arbitration would compel the parties to arbitrate a "deadwood" claim that is clearly time-barred

The Supreme Court recently observed that initiation of proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for cheque dishonour does not constitute continuing cause of action for initiating arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act).

A bench of Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud, Justice JB Pardiwala, and Justice Manoj Misra dismissed an arbitration petition seeking the appointment of an arbitrator eleven years after cheques were dishonoured, on the ground that the claims were barred by limitation.

Elfit Arabia, an entity incorporated in the United Arab Emirates, was approached by the respondents to finance a telecommunication project undertaken by Telesuprecon Nigeria Limited (TNL). A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was executed on June 1, 2004, with TNL represented by a director of Concept Hotel BARONS Limited, the first respondent. 
Pursuant to the terms of the MoU, the petitioners claim to have disbursed funds on various occasions. A supplementary MoU was executed on August 2, 2006,outlining the terms of repayment and settlement of the petitioners' dues, including a lien on the respondents' property and issuance of cheques as financial support.
On May 7, 2011, fifteen cheques amounting to Rs. 7.30 crores provided by the respondents were allegedly dishonoured. On June 2, 2011, the petitioners issued a legal notice to the respondents to implement the MoU and make the necessary payment. Eleven years later, on July 4, 2022, the petitioners invoked arbitration as per clause 19 of the MoU. The respondents did not reply to the notice. A fresh notice was issued on October 27, 2022, again calling for arbitration, which went unanswered.Subsequently, the present petition was filed before the Supreme Court under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act.

The respondents argued that the petitioner's claims were barred by limitation and should be dismissed by the Court. Petitioner contended that during the intervening period it initiated proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act against the respondents. The Magistrate acquitted the respondents on July 23, 2018. An appeal against this order is currently pending before the Bombay High Court. 

The Supreme Court noted that while the determination of whether a claim is barred by limitation typically falls within the arbitral tribunal's domain, the Court may intervene to reject clearly non-arbitrable or dead claims. The Court emphasized the need to prevent parties from being compelled into arbitration for claims that are demonstrably time-barred.

Referring to the principles established in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, the Court highlighted that it may interfere at the referral stage if the claim is ex-facie time-barred. 

The Supreme Court found that the notices invoking arbitration in July 2022 and October 2022 were issued eleven years after the cause of action arose in 2011, exceeding the three-year limitation period as per Article 55 of the Schedule under Limitation Act, 1963. The initiation of arbitration proceedings was hopelessly barred by limitation, the court said.

Additionally, the Court noted that proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, which were separately initiated, do not constitute a continuing cause of action for initiating arbitration. Therefore, the petitioners' argument that these proceedings implied a continuing cause of action was rejected.

Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the arbitration petition, stating that referring the dispute to arbitration would compel the parties to arbitrate a "deadwood" claim that is clearly time-barred

Recently, the Supreme Court held that the conviction of the accused child who was a 'child in conflict with law' cannot be sustained unless the preliminary assessment to ascertain the physical and mental capacity of the child to commit the crime and the need to try the child as an adult or a juvenile was adhered to as the mandatory requirements under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015.

Reversing the findings of the High Court, the Bench Comprising Justices B.R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta observed that the question of whether there is a need for trial of the accused child as an adult or a juvenile under Section 19 of JJ Act could only be decided based on the preliminary assessment conducted by the Juvenile Justice Board (“Board”) under Section 15 of JJ Act which ascertains whether a child who has completed or is above the age of sixteen years has the mental and physical capacity to commit the heinous offence alleged to be committed by him.

In the instant case, a charge sheet was submitted against the accused by the police, who was a Juvenile at the time of the commission of an offence, before the trial court without following the mandatory requirements of Sections 15 and 19 of the JJ Act. The trial court convicted the accused and the same was upheld by the High Court.

Against the impugned judgment passed by the High Court, the accused/appellant preferred a plea before the Supreme Court.

Before the Supreme Court, counsel for the Appellant contended that there had been a flagrant violation of a mandatory provision of Sections 15 and 19 of the JJ Act. She contended that despite knowing the fact that the appellant was CICL at the time of the commission of an offence, the charge sheet was submitted before the trial court by the police. She stressed that the child cannot be tried under the JJ Act unless the preliminary assessment to ascertain whether the child was physically and mentally fit to commit such an offence was completed.

Finding force in the appellant's contention, the Supreme Court held that the entire proceedings taken against the appellant right from the stage of investigation and the completion of trial stand vitiated as having been undertaken in gross violation of the mandatory requirements of the JJ Act.

In a nutshell, the court held that the accused who was a child in conflict with the law at the time of the commission of an offence cannot be tried by the trial court but only by the children court as mandated under Section 19 of the JJ Act. The court clarified that it was only after the preliminary assessment report of the JJ Board that the children's court under Section 19 would be eligible to try the accused child.

While relying on its judgment of Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court held that the procedure provided under Sections 15 and 19 is to be mandatorily followed by the court while trying the accused child for committing the heinous offence(s) under JJ Act.

The Supreme Court ultimately quashed and set aside the impugned judgment and directed that the appellant who is presently lodged in jail shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.